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THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
ACT OF 1974-WHO SHALL LIVE IN
PUBLIC HOUSING?
Most families living in the United States today are aware that securing
desirable, or even adequate, housing at a price they can afford to pay is
becoming increasingly difficult. For those at the lowest income levels, it is
virtually impossible.' Housing is only one of the areas in which the private
market has demonstrated an unresponsiveness to the needs of all economic
strata, but it is a highly visible area, and one which has grave implications
for society as a whole. For housing is inextricably bound in the knot of
serious social and economic problems which interact to produce that most
intractable of modern maladies, urban blight.
The need for government to take an active role in subsidizing housing for
low income groups is a proposition so well established it is scarcely worth
debating.2 Federally assisted housing has been with us, in one form or
another, throughout most of this century.8 The United States Housing Act
of 19374 marked the establishment of the federal housing programs which,
with certain modifications, have survived until today.
The history of public housing in this country is a chronicle of frustration
and failure. The promise seemed bright in 1949 when Congress spoke of a
decent home for every American family "as soon as feasible." 5  In assessing
the country's short-term housing requirements, Congress agreed that we
would need 135,000 new public housing units each year for the following
six years, or a total of 810,000 units. In looking back over the past 25 years,
however, one cannot help but wonder why that promise proved so empty.
Actual production of public housing between 1949 and 1968 totalled only
about 500,000 units, or roughly two-thirds of the 6-year goal in 20 years.6
1. See generally REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUnuNo
THE AMERICAN CrrY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1968) [hereinafter
cited as DOUGLAS REPORT].
2. "mo expect the free market to supply housing for all Americans without subsidy
requires a flight from reality." Id. at 10.
3. For a thorough examination of the historical development of assisted housing, see
L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATIoN (1968).
4. Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888.
5. Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
6. DOUGLAS REPORT 14. The inadequacy of this effort becomes even more striking
in light of the following statistics:
Demolitions of housing by public action alone destroyed more units of hous-
ing than were built, in all federally aided programs.
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Although results have been disappointing, there is some consensus that the
basic structure of our public housing programs is sound, and that failures can
be attributed to meager funding and general public resistance to program
implementation. 7 Federal subsidies for public housing were initially devised
to cover only the capital costs of such projects.8  Maintenance and operating
expenses were to be financed entirely by rent receipts. This system
performed adequately for a time, but by the 1960's, the combined effects of
inflation and building deterioration had rendered the debt service subsidy
unworkable.9 Housing authorities were forced to defer maintenance opera-
tions and raise rents beyond the means of the very poor.10 Congress
responded by providing small additional subsidies, up to a maximum of $120
per unit per year, to cover operating costs for units occupied by elderly
tenants.'1 These too proved insufficient to support public housing for the
abject poor,' 2 and increasing numbers of public housing operations faced
The total current housing inventory is about 68 million units.
The annual rate of all new housing construction, private and public, in re-
cent years has been less than 1.5 million units.
A conservative estimate of the substandard and overcrowded housing is 11
million units.
Id.
7. See, e.g., Supplementary Views of Mr. Koch on H.R. 15361:
This Committee, among others in the Congress, spent considerable time in
exploring the nature and extend [sic] of the so-called "scandals" in the exist-
ing housing programs. . . . mhe most glaring weaknesses in the existing
program operations can be attributed to inept HUD program management,
rather than to defects in the programs themselves. The study of assisted hous-
ing programs by the Administration, conducted on an "after the fact" basis to
justify the January, 1973 moratorium on new program activity is less than con-
vincing. In fact, on balance the existing housing programs stand up well.
Supplementary Views of Mr. Koch on H.R. 15361, H.R. REP. No. 1114, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 543 (Comm. Print 1974) [the pagination is taken from Compilation of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, Joint Explanatory Statement of the Managers
of the Committee of Conference, printed for the use of the Committee on Banking and
Currency; hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 93-1-114 and S. REP. No. 93-693 are cited as Com-
pilation].
8. See Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, § 10, 50 Stat. 891.
9. See S. REP. No. 392, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1969).
10. By 1968, public housing had become too expensive for a substantial number of
poor households:
The Commission recognizes that the very low-income groups cannot, in many
cases, afford minimum rentals in low-rent public housing. . . . In 1966 the
average rental for all low-rent public housing in the Nation was about $48 a
month . . . . At 20 percent of income, this would require an annual income
of $2,880, which is in the higher levels of the poverty range.
DOUGLAS REPORT 190.
11. Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 203, 75 Stat. 149.
12. A simple calculation will illustrate the inadequacy of the additional operating
subsidy. Assuming that a public housing unit costs $50 per month to operate, the an-
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bankruptcy. Finally, in 1969, Congress authorized the payment of operat-
ing subsidies without the $120 annual limit, as required "to maintain the
low-income character of projects," while providing that no tenant would pay
more that 25 percent of adjusted gross income for rent.' 3 This attempt by
Congress to maintain public housing facilities for the neediest families could
not succeed without adequate appropriations and cooperation from the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). It received
neither.'
4
Insufficient funding has not been the only difficulty plaguing public
housing. Welfare programs generally are not popular in the United States,
and race prejudice is undeniably a significant causal factor, since an
inordinate proportion of the poor is black.15 Public opinion runs high
against the residents of slum housing who, it is widely felt, are there because
they are too lazy or too venal to improve their lot in life.'0 The attitude
that the government is not obliged to house those who have somehow shown
themselves to be unworthy permeates public housing policy to this day. The
welfare recipient, the unwed mother, the female-headed household, the
juvenile in trouble with the law: all are likely victims of exclusionary
attempts by local housing authorities who feel that theirs is a disruptive,
potentially dangerous presence in public housing.17 Yet these families are
nual operating costs of that unit are $600. Prior to the amendment providing for oper-
ating subsidies, supra note 11, a family with a gross income of $1,500 a year would have
to pay 40 percent ($600) of that income for rent. With the $120 annual operating sub-
sidy, the amount payable by the family would still be 32 percent of gross income. In
reality, the problem was much more severe, since operating costs on units in many urban
areas were often substantially higher than $50 a month. S. REP. No. 392, 91st Cong.,
lstSess. 19 (1969).
13. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-152, 83 Stat. 379.
14. The new legislation ostensibly was designed to enable local public housing au-
thorities to serve the very poor by abolishing the rental formula requiring the tenant
to cover all or a certain proportion of his unit's operating expenses; the 25 percent rent
maximum served to relieve those families who were being assessed at a higher percent-
age rate. HUD, however, interpreted the amendments to authorize subsidies only for
those tenants who were paying the 25 percent maximum rate. See Roisman. The Right
to Public Housing, 39 GEO. WASH. L. Rlv. 691, 694-97 (1971).
15. Evidence to support the conclusion that blacks occupy an economic position in-
ferior to that of whites is found in census data cited in DOUGLAS REPORT 45 and Rois-
man, supra note 14, at 720 n.141.
16. See L. FREDMAN, supra note 3, at 20-21.
17. See, e.g., Starr, Which of the Poor Shall Live in Public Housing?, 23 Tim PUB.
INTEREST 116 (Spring 1971). See also Thomas v. Housing Authority, 282 F. Supp. 575
(1967) (city housing authority could not automatically exclude or evict tenant from low
rent housing solely because of status as unwed mother). It is difficult to quarrel with
the argument that public housing tenants ought to be protected from neighbors who ha-
bitually engage in antisocial behavior, but this is reasoning which should be used only
to justify the eviction of tenants who have proven themselves unable or unwilling to co-
[Vol. 25: 320
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among the very poorest; they are the ones whose housing plight is most
desperate.' 8
It is for these two reasons, the funding structure of public housing and a
widespread lack of sympathy for and unwillingness to help the poor, that
housing relief for those at the lowest income levels tends to be overshadowed
by policies aimed at more "affluent" low and moderate income groups.19 In
pursuing the dream of a decent home and suitable living environment for
every American family, our best efforts never have been directed at those
who need them most.
20
Early in 1973, the Nixon Administration impounded funds which Con-
gress had appropriated for housing programs, on the theory that those
programs had proved unworkable. 21  This executive action provided the
impetus for the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,22 which
effected a complete revision of the procedures by which communities receive
and expend federal funds for housing and development, 23 and which
exist peacefully in their project. The danger arises when the argument is used to ex-
clude a class of eligible tenants on the ground that, as a class, they present a greater
danger of disruption, or when it is used to enforce certain social mores which have little
or no relation to orderly project operation.
18. For example, in 1965, female-headed families comprised 11.4 percent of the total
population of the nation's 100 largest standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs),
but they constituted 20.4 percent of the poverty area population. Families relying on
income other than earnings comprised 8.3 percent of the total population, but 13.4 per-
cent of the poverty area population. DOUGLAS REPORT 52.
19. Too often the dilemmas of housing the poor are masked by considering them
in conjunction with the housing problems of the moderate, middle and upper
income groups. Problems affecting these latter groups are more readily allevi-
ated. The more encouraging record in this respect, indeed, has virtually no
relevance to the urgent needs of the poor ....
Roisman, supra note 14, at 691.
20. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON URBAN HOUSING, A DE-
CENT HOME 42 (1968); DOUGLAS REPORT 181.
21. See Compilation 351; Wall St. Journal, Jan. 9, 1973, at 3, col. 1.
22. Act of Aug. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered
sections of 12, 15, 20, 40, 42, 49 U.S.C.).
23. Title I of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5301-53 (Supp. 1975), eliminates certain fed-
eral categorical grant programs for urban renewal, code enforcement, model cities, water
and sewer facilities, open spaces, historic site preservation, and rehabilitation loans, and
replaces them with a revenue sharing type block grant program. To receive these funds,
communities must demonstrate that they are making realistic efforts to provide an ade-
quate supply of low income housing, with the further objective of promoting a wider
choice of housing opportunities and avoiding undue concentrations of assisted persons in
poverty areas. Extensive analysis of Title I is beyond the scope of this article, other than
to observe that the tying of housing programs which many communities do not want to
federal aid for more desired programs, such as water and sewers, provides a very strong
incentive for the construction of public housing. For a comprehensive analysis of the
provisions of Title I, see Kushner, Community Planning and Development Under the
1976]
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amended the United States Housing Act of 1937 to eliminate certain federal
housing programs, 24 modify others, 25 and draft a completely new program
for low income housing assistance, known as section 8.26
It is extremely doubtful that any of the programs still nominally in force,
other than section 8 and conventional public housing, will be used in the
near future to increase low income housing stocks. 27  This article will
analyze those provisions of the two housing programs which can be expected
to have a significant impact on the poor, in order to demonstrate that,
although ostensibly designed to distribute housing dollars where they are
most urgently needed, the programs actually are heavily weighted toward
persons of moderate income.
L. THE PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM
The 1974 Housing and Community Development Act makes substantial
modifications to standards of eligibility for conventional public housing. By
far the most significant change, measured in terms of its potential effect on
the poor, is the redefinition of low income. The Housing Act of 1937
provided that "the dwellings in low-rent housing shall be available solely for
families of low income," and defined low income families as those who are in
the lowest income group and who cannot afford to pay enough to cause
private enterprise in their area to build an adequate supply of decent
housing.2 8
The 1974 Act deleted the requirement that conventional public housing be
occupied solely by families of low income; rather, it targets two distinct
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 8 CLEAMNGHOUSE REV. 661 (Jan.
Supp. 1975).
24. The section 23 program, 42 U.S.C. § 1421a (1970), was phased out of existence
as of December 31, 1974. Under section 23, local housing authorities could lease new
or existing housing and then sublet it to tenants, paying the difference between the mar-
ket rent for the unit and the amount the tenant could pay. Basically a rent supplement
program, one of its principal strengths was that it enabled low income families to live
outside of poverty and racially-impacted areas. Many of the features of the section 23
program now are embodied in the new section 8 program.
25. Of particular interest are the modifications to the conventional public housing
program, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1437a-d, 1437g (Supp. 1975), discussed pp. 324-29 infra.
26. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f (Supp. 1975).
27. With the exception of the section 23 program, none of the existing housing pro-
grams were specifically dismantled by the 1974 Act. It is HUD's apparent intention,
however, that section 8 be used as the primary vehicle for providing subsidized housing.
See Housing and Urban Affairs Daily, Aug. 23, 1974, at 102, (views of former HUD
Secretary James Lynn); Compilation 368.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(2) (1970).
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income groups for eligibility. "Low income families" are defined as those
who cannot afford to pay enough to cause private enterprise in their area to
provide an adequate supply of decent housing.2 9 A second eligible group,
"very low income families," is defined as those whose incomes do not exceed
50 percent of the median family income for the area.80 At least 20 percent
of all units in any project placed under contract pursuant to the new Act
must be occupied by families in the very low income category.31
A comparison of census data on median incomes in several large standard
metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs)32 with the incomes of families residing
in public housing reveals the practical effect of the new statutory language:
Median Income in Six Major Metropolitan Areas38s
SMSA Median 50% of Median
Washington, D.C. $12,933 $6,467
Chicago 11,931 5,966
Boston 11,449 5,725
Los Angeles 10,972 5,486
New York 10,870 5,435
Atlanta 10,695 5,347
According to HUD figures, for the 12 months ending September 30, 1973,
the median income of all families actually residing in public housing projects
was $2,864.34 The obvious discrepancy between the census figures and
those of HUD becomes even more significant in view of the fact that 50
percent of median income represents not an eligibility limit for public
housing, but the income ceiling for the lowest income group. Thus, the
poorest families are to be allocated a percentage of the available housing
units but are no longer designated the sole beneficiaries of the public housing
program.
Three new provisions of the public housing statute are designed to
promote the policy of combining a wider range of incomes in subsidized
housing projects, a policy generally referred to as income or economic mix.
These provisions can be expected to have the net effect of raising average
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(2) (Supp. 1975).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 1437a(1).
32. Use of the word "area" in the Act means standard metropolitan statistical area
(SMSA), or a county in nonmetropolitan areas. Compilation 371.
33. Median income figures for SMSAs were obtained from U.S. DEPT. OF COM-
MERCE, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATIsTIcs ADMIN., BUREAU OF THE CENsUs, 1970
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, United States Summary, General Social and Eco-
nomic Characteristics, Table 184.
34. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1973 HUD Statistical
Yearbook, Table 86. Median income for the same period for all black families in public
housing was $2,723. Id.
1976]
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income levels of public housing tenants. The local housing authority
is required to comply with HUD regulations to ensure that projects will
represent a broad range of incomes, avoiding concentrations of low in-
come and deprived families with serious social problems. 8  Only 20
percent of the units in new projects are reserved specifically for occupancy
by families of very low income.36 Finally, in order to qualify for operating
subsidies, a housing authority must receive in aggregate rentals from all
families residing in its projects a sum equal to at least 20 percent of the
combined incomes of all tenant families.8 7  Clearly, this is a statutory
authorization for local housing agencies to consider income as a criterion for
housing admissions and, when sufficient numbers of very poor families are
already being housed, to prefer the more affluent applicants.
While the statute's expansive definition of very low income does not
necessarily exclude the poorest families from public housing, neither does it
express a policy preference for them. The conclusion seems inescapable
that the redefined income standards, together with the method of financing
public housing projects which requires partial support through the rent rolls,
will work to the disadvantage of the most needy. To ensure the fiscal
soundness of public housing operations, it is clearly in the interest of local
housing agencies to accord a preference to those families whose incomes are
within the upper ranges of the very low income definition. The new Act has
no safeguards against this situation, and in fact may be said to compel it
through the mandate of economic mix.
The Act does attempt to prevent discrimination in admissions policies in
favor of the higher income class by prohibiting the maintenance of vacant
units to await higher income tenants when lower income applicants are
available.38 Thus, the preferred ratio of 80 percent low income to 20
percent very low income families is somewhat flexible in that it may not be
used as justification for empty housing projects. Whether this provides
sufficient protection for the poorest families is debatable. The statute
prescribes no methods for assigning priorities to applicants, so families with
the lowest incomes presumably could languish on a waiting list indefinitely,
as long as a higher income applicant is available to fill any vacancy. A
significant proportion of very low income households could be, in effect, too
poor for public housing.
The new Act deletes the requirement of a 20 percent gap between
maximum eligibility limits for public housing and the lowest rents available
35. 42U.S.C.A. § 1437d(c) (4) (A) (Supp. 1975).
36. Id. § 1437a(1).
37. Id. § 1437g(b).
38. Id. § 1437d(c)(4)(A).
[Vol. 25:320
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on the private market, as well as maximum income limits for continued
occupancy. Public housing authorities are to assume the responsibility for
establishing income ceilings, subject to review by HUD, and the local
authority must certify to HUD that each tenant family "was admitted in
accordance with duly adopted regulations and approved income limits."8 9
However, standards for the establishment of such admissions policies have
been omitted from the Act. The requirement that applicants be notified
promptly of decisions regarding their eligibility is unchanged from the prior
law, and there is still a statutory right to an informal hearing on the question
of eligibility.
40
The 1937 Act was amended in 1969 to provide that rents in public
housing could not exceed 25 percent of family income after certain statutory
deductions. 41 Furthermore, it was amended in 1971 to provide that no
public agency was permitted to reduce welfare benefits to public housing
tenants as a result of this rent limitation. 42 The 1974 Act changes these
provisions: tenants pay from 20 to 25 percent of adjusted income if that
percentage is greater than or equal to the "minimum rent," and minimum
rent is set at the family's welfare housing allowance or five percent of family
gross income, whichever is greater.
43
The minimum rent provision was inserted to cope with what Congress
apparently perceived as the injustice of some tenants paying no rent. The
conference committee expressed an interest in making sure that all tenants
were required to pay their fair share. 44 The effect of this provision is
39. Id. § 1437d(c)(2).
40. Id. § 1437d(c)(3).
41. Act of Dec. 24, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-152, Title II, § 213(a), 83 Stat. 389.
42. Act of Dec. 22, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-213, § 9, 85 Stat. 776, amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 1402 (1970).
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(1) (Supp. 1975). The statutory deductions also have been
clarified to eliminate certain double deductions. See National Tenants Organization,
Inc. v. HUD, 358 F. Supp. 312 (D.D.C. 1973). Dependency deductions are limited to
those dependents specifically enumerated, and a new exclusion has been added for foster
child care payments.
44. Compilation 374. But see Supplemental Views of Congressman Joseph Moakley
to H.R. 15361:
The minimum rent provision addresses itself, according to this report, to a
"substantial portion of tenants who are not contributing a fair share toward
costs of their housing units and seeks to prevent zero or minimum rents caused
by application of the maximum rent provision of the 1,969 Housing Act." In
fact, the income derived from those families will be insignificant since the Sec-
retary of HUD advises us that less than one half of one percent of public
housing tenants pay zero rent.
Id. at 554-55.
1976]
Catholic University Law Review
peculiar and perhaps symptomatic of the bias against the poor which is
repeatedly made manifest in public housing programs; families take the
statutory deductions and pay one-fourth of the remainder as rent, but if they
are too sick or too poor, they are assessed at a higher percentage of adjusted
income. 4
5
The Act provides a separate authorization for operating subsidies.40  This
funding provision is distinct from the annual contributions contract between
HUD and the local housing agency, which cannot exceed annual expendi-
tures for principal and interest on housing agency obligations issued to
finance the development or acquisition of projects. 47  Under the new law,
local housing authorities will enter into two separate contracts for HUD
funds, assuming that Congress appropriates and HUD releases monies for
operating subsidies. The Secretary of HUD is not required to provide
operating subsidies, but may do so after taking into account "the character
and location of the project and characteristics of the families served, or the
costs of providing comparable services as determined in accordance with
criteria or a formula representing the operations of a prototype well-managed
project.' '48  While this authorization for operating subsidies without dollar
limits is an absolute necessity if public housing is to serve the neediest
families, it must be read in conjunction with the minimum rent and income
mix provisions. HUD apparently has discretion to deny operating subsidies
to projects which it feels are incurring unusually high maintenance costs,
collecting rentals which are too low, or accepting tenants who do not promote
a sufficiently broad income mix. Since HUD naturally would want to
spread its thin resources as far as possible, this discretion is likely to be
exercised to grant operating subsidies only to those projects which can
demonstrate a high measure of financial stability, that is, those whose rent
receipts reflect a high percentage of moderate income tenants.
The Act directs local housing authorities to comply with any procedures
and requirements which may be prescribed by the Secretary of HUD to
45. The minimum rent provision will apply only to families in extraordinarily dire
financial straits. For example, a family with an annual gross income of $1,500 and four
minor children would have an adjusted income after statutory deductions of $225 a year.
Under the old law, they would be required to pay only 25 percent of this, or about $56,
for rent. Under the new Act, annual rent is assessed at $75.
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437g(a) (Supp. 1975).
47. Id. § 1437c(a).
48. Id. § 1437g(a). The Act thus vests a great deal of discretion in HUD to deter-
mine which projects are to receive operating subsidies. A local housing agency under-
going financial pressures must increase its income through either more federal money
or more rental receipts. In not making operating subsidies mandatory for every project
which needs them, the Act apparently permits HUD to require that increased costs be
covered by rent rolls.
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ensure that projects will be operated according to sound management
practices. The Act specifically includes rules governing such factors as
income mix; the prompt collection of rents and processing of evictions in
cases of nonpayment; establishment of effective management-tenant relation-
ships for purposes of formulating security and maintenance standards, with
joint enforcement of such standards by the housing agency and tenant
councils, when they exist; and development by the local agency of viable
homeownership opportunities for low income families which are capable of
assuming these responsibilities.49 Additionally, project operations eligible
for subsidy are defined to include tenant programs and services, particularly
when there is maximum feasible participation of tenants in the development
and administration of such programs and services. Formation and operation
of tenant groups which participate in the management of public housing
projects, training of tenants in project management, and utilization of tenants'
services in actual operation are all activities eligible for subsidy under the
Act.50
II. THE SECTION 8 LEASED HOUsING PROGRAM
The new section 8 leased housing program represents an attempt to
promote economically mixed housing and to partially restore the severed
connection between the public and private housing markets. Under the new
program, tenants will pay a percentage of income to owners of assisted units,
with the difference between the tenant's share and a predetermined fair
market rent for that unit made up by HUD.51
Section 8 creates two separate subcategories of assisted housing: existing,
and new or substantially rehabilitated. In administering the program for
existing housing, the Secretary of HUD is authorized to enter into annual
contributions contracts with public housing agencies, pursuant to which the
agencies may contract to make assistance payments to owners. When no
public housing agency exists, or when the public housing agency is unable to
implement the program, the Secretary may contract directly with owners and
perform all the functions normally delegated to the local agency.
52
For new or substantially rehabilitated dwellings, the procedure is reversed.
The Secretary is authorized to enter into contracts with owners or prospective
owners who agree to construct or rehabilitate housing for occupancy partially
or totally by low income families. HUD will make -the assistance payments
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(c) (4) (Supp. 1975).
50. Id. § 1437a(4).
51. Id. § 1437f(c)(1), (3).
52. Id. § 1437f(b)(1).
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directly to owners. Alternatively, the Secretary may enter into annual
contributions contracts with public housing agencies, and the agencies will
contract with the owners or prospective owners for assistance payments.5 3
Thus, the statute seems to contemplate, at least with respect to new housing
stock, that the responsibility for day to day administration of the program
will rest primarily with HU D and not with local housing agencies.5 4
Assistance payments may be made on behalf of families whose incomes do
not exceed 80 percent of median income for the area.5 5 At least 30 percent
of the families assisted under section 8 must be very low income families at
the time of initial rental, that is, their incomes must not exceed 50 percent of
the median income for the area.56 Rental assistance payments may be made
only for those units actually occupied by an eligible family. 57 If the tenant
vacates before his lease expires, or if management is making a good faith
effort to fill a vacancy, payments may continue for up to 60 days.56 Since
owners will lose their subsidies for unoccupied units, it is incumbent upon
them to find tenants who are least likely to be transient, and it has been
suggested that this provision may work to the disadvantage of certain tenant
classes which have been stereotyped as unstable, such as welfare recipients,
female-headed households, and racial minorities.59
The portion of rent paid by the tenant is fixed at between 15 and 25
percent of gross family income. 60 The statute provides that the 15 percent
ceiling is mandatory for large very low income families and very large low
income families. 6' For other families, the Secretary is directed to establish
rates up to 25 percent of gross income, taking into account relative poverty,
53. Id. § 1437f(b)(2).
54. See Compilation 312.
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(f)(1) (Supp. 1975).
56. Id. §§ 1437f(c)(7), 1437f(f)(2). See sample median incomes for several large
metropolitan areas p. 325 supra.
57. Id. § 1437f(c)(4). HUD regulations provide that, in the event of a va-
cancy after initial rental, the owner will receive continuing housing assistance pay-
ments in the amount of 80 percent of the contract rent for a period of up to 60 days.
HUD Reg. 881.107, 40 Fed. Reg. 18906 (1975).
58. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c) (4) (Supp. 1975).
59. See Bishop, Assisted Housing Under the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974, 8 CLEAIUNGHOUSE RaV. 672, 682 (Supp. Jan. 1975), in which the author
predicts this effect of the provision permitting discontinuation of subsidy payments on
vacant units.
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c)(3) (Supp. 1975).
61. Id. HUD regulations define "large family" as one which includes six or more
minors, other than the head of household or spouse. A "very large family" contains
eight or more minors other than the head of household or spouse. See HUD Reg.
881.118, 40 Fed. Reg. 18908-09 (1975).
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number of children, and extent of medical or other extraordinary expenses. 62
Since these rent fixing provisions have not yet been implemented, it is not
clear how rent ratios based upon gross income will compare with those based
on adjusted income for conventional public housing.6 3
Contracts executed under section 8 between HUD and owners or local
housing agencies and owners, must establish a maximum monthly rent
(including utilities and maintenance charges) for each assisted unit.6 4  The
maximum rent cannot exceed by more than 10 percent the fair market
rentals established by HUD for modest dwelling units of various sizes and
types in the market area.65  Fair market rentals are to be reviewed
annually, or more frequently if necessary, and adjusted upward to reflect
increases in housing costs in the general area. Additional rent increases may
be approved to provide for increases in property taxes, utility rates, and
similar costs. Rent adjustments may not result in material discrepancies
between the rents charged for assisted and comparable unassisted units.6 6 It
was determined by Congress that the last restriction on rent hikes would
adequately cover legitimate cost increases while preventing government
subsidy of costs attributable to inefficient management practices. 67
One of public housing's most formidable problems during recent years has
been the attempt to deal with rapidly rising costs and fixed revenues. Local
housing agencies have been caught in the financial crunch: forbidden by
statute from squeezing additional rents from tenants,6 8 they and HUD
have been unable to persuade the courts that staggering losses could justify
avoiding the statutory rent ceiling. 69 The new Act has dealt with this prob-
62. 42U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c) (3) (Supp. 1975).
63. For very poor families, section 8 housing will be more expensive. For example,
a family with three minors and a gross income of $2,000 would have an adjusted income
for conventional public housing of $1,000. Annual rent for conventional public housing
could be no more than $250. Under section 8, the same family would pay anywhere
from $300 to $500 annual rent, depending upon the percentage rate of gross income,
between 15 and 25 percent, for which they qualify.
64. 42U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c)(1) (Supp. 1975).
65. Rentals may exceed fair market values by 20 percent when the Secretary deter-
mines that special circumstances warrant the increased ceiling, or when the increase is
necessary to implement a local housing assistance plan. Id. For the current schedule
of fair market rents applicable to section 8 existing housing, see 40 Fed. Reg. 15580-
860 (1975).
66. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c) (2) (A)-(C) (Supp. 1975).
67. Compilation 371-72.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970).
69. See, e.g., National Tenants Organization, Inc. v. HUD, 358 F. Supp. 312 (D.D.C.
1973); Barber v. White, 351 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Conn. 1972). Both suits involved ten-
ant challenges to attempts to meet operating deficits through increased rents.
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lem in section 8 by placing the responsibility for ensuring that rental assist-
ance payments are increased on a timely basis to meet rising costs squarely
upon the Secretary of HUD. 70
Practices affecting the substantive rights of tenants are, for the most part,
delivered into private hands by the new Act. Contracts between public
housing agencies and owners for rental of existing housing must permit the
owner to select tenants (subject to the terms of the annual contributions
contract between HUD and the housing agency), and to establish standard
maintenance and repair practices. The public housing agency has the sole
right to evict, but the owner may make representations to the agency for
termination of tenancy.
71
For newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated units, the contract
between HUD and the owner must provide that all ownership, management,
and maintenance responsibilities, including selection and eviction of tenants,
are to be assumed by the owner. 72  The owner may, but is not required to,
contract with a public housing agency or any other entity approved by HUD
for the performance of these functions. Specifically excluded from section 8
is the requirement that applicants who are determined to be ineligible for
subsidy be accorded an informal hearing.73  Model lease and grievance
procedures are inapplicable to section 8 dwelling units, with the exception of
new or rehabilitated units owned by a public housing authority. 74
70. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c) (6) (Supp. 1975) provides:
The Secretary shall take such steps as may be necessary, including the mak-
ing of contracts for assistance payments in amounts in excess of the amounts
required at the time of the initial renting of dwelling units, the reservation of
annual contributions authority for the purpose of amending housing assistance
contracts, or the allocation of a portion of new authorizations for the purpose
of amending housing assistance contracts, to assure that assistance payments
are increased on a timely basis to cover increases in maximum monthly rents
or decreases in family incomes.
This language would seem to impose upon the Secretary a judicially enforceable duty
to private owners and housing authorities who are feeling the pinch of inflation. Obvi-
ously, HUD will have to commit housing funds rather sparingly in order to guard
against unforseeable cost increases in the future. Moreover, it is in HUD's best inter-
est to house tenants with relatively stable sources of income, in order to guard against
possible decreases in rent receipts in the future.
71. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(d)(1) (Supp. 1975).
72. Id. § 1437f(e)(2).
73. id. § 1437f(h). But see HUD Reg. 881.218(b)(6), 40 Fed. Reg. 18916-17
(1975) (eligibility hearing provided in situations involving rehabilitated housing owned
by a public housing authority); HUD Reg. 882.209(f), 40 Fed. Reg. 19621 (1975) (in-
formal hearing accorded families determined to be ineligible for participation in the ex-
isting housing program).
74. HUD Reg. 881.226, 40 Fed. Reg. 18918 (1975). The Model Lease and Griev-
ance Procedures are set forth in HUD Circulars RHM 7465.8 (Feb. 22, 1971), and
RHM 7465.9 (Feb. 22, 1971).
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Although many of the protections afforded tenants under prior law have
been removed from the new Act, those rights which are of constitutional
dimension are still applicable. Thus, due process requires that a tenant not
be evicted without good cause, and without sufficient notice and opportunity
for a hearing.75 It has been suggested that there may be some difficulty in
satisfying state action requirements in cases arising under section 8, when
program administration has been assumed by private owners.76 It should be
possible, however, to find state action in section 8 programs by pointing to
the degree of state control over program administration;77 for example, the
contractual relationship under which local public housing agencies distribute
federal subsidies and, in some cases, retain exclusive authority to terminate
leases, and under which HUD retains full control over rent levels, signifi-
cantly insinuates the state in project administration. 78
Recently published HUD regulations provide a clearer picture of how the
section 8 program will work in practice. 79 For existing housing, families
will apply to the local housing agency administering the program for a
"certificate of family participation." The agency may issue only as many
certificates as it will be able to honor with funds available under the terms of
its annual contributions contract with HUD. After issuance of the certifi-
cate, the family has 60 days in which to locate a suitable dwelling unit which
the owner will agree to lease to it. The local authority will inspect the
unit for compliance with HUD housing quality standards, and enter into a
contract with the owner for assistance payments. The lease may be for a
term of not less than one nor more than three years.
Under this plan, the burden of breaking down existing patterns of
economic and racial segregation in housing is placed primarily on the
individual family. The regulations do provide that the public housing
agency may assist in finding units for families who, because of age,
75. See, e.g., Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
76. Bishop, supra note 59, at 682-83. Ms. Bishop suggests that fifth amendment due
process should be pleaded along with the fourteenth amendment claims, since the test
of "public action" under the fifth amendment is substantially the same as state action
requirements, and both can be satisfied by demonstrating local approval, use of the ju-
dicial process, receipt of federal subsidy, supervision by HUD or the local housing
agency, and the housing assistance payments contract. Id. at 683.
77. In Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1238-39 (4th Cir. 1973), the court found that
operation of privately owned, FHA assisted apartments involved state action, pointing
to the local government's authorization for the program, receipt of federal subsidies and
financing benefits, and use of state eviction procedures. See also Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
78. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1437f(c)(1), (c)(3), (d)(1)(B) (Supp. 1975). These attributes
of publicness closely parallel those discussed in note 77 supra.
79. See 40 Fed. Reg. 16934-65, 18902-44, 19612-3 1 (1975).
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handicap, or other reasons, are unable to locate a suitable unit. The agency
must provide such assistance when the family alleges that discrimination is
preventing it from finding an approvable unit. sO An inherent weakness in
this scheme, however, is that participation by private owners is voluntary,
and given the substantial recordkeeping requirements imposed upon owners,
along with the prospect of civil liability for constitutional violations, it is
difficult to see why many private owners would elect to take part in the
program. Public housing agencies are directed by the regulations to under-
take certain activities to encourage participation by owners, but for the most
part these activities involve publicizing the program to organizations which
already have demonstrated an interest in housing low income groups."'
'For new or substantially rehabilitated housing, the agreement to enter into
housing assistance payments is executed between HUD and the owner prior
to the start of construction or rehabilitation. This provision places upon
HUD the responsibility for seeing that the income mix policies of the Act are
implemented. Assistance payments may be made with respect to up to 100
percent of the units in a particular building or project; HUD has announced,
however, that it will accord preference to those projects in which assistance
payments are limited to 20 percent or less of the units.8 2 Sites for new or
rehabilitated units must promote greater choice of housing opportunity and
avoid undue concentrations of assisted persons in areas containing a high
proportion of low income persons. 83  The certificate of family participation
is not utilized for new and rehabilitated units; the responsibility for taking
applications, verifying income, and selecting families is assumed by the
owner. 84
III. THE THRUST OF INCOME MIX
The policy of promoting a mix of families at various income levels in public
housing is strongly expressed throughout the 1974 Act. This policy can be
justified on the theory that the poorest families, as well as those with severe
social problems, can benefit from the role models provided by more stable,
higher income families. It also may be desirable to disperse the poor over
wider geographical areas, rather than forcing their concentration in urban
slums where they present a highly visible target for public opprobrium and
official neglect.
80. HUD Reg. 882.103, 40 Fed. Reg. 19614 (1975).
81. Id. 882.208, 40 Fed. Reg. 19620.
82. Id. 881.104, 40 Fed. Reg. 18906.
83. Id. 881.112(c), 40 Fed. Reg. 18907.
84. Id. 881.119, 40 Fed. Reg. 18909. The owner may contract with any pub-
lic or private entity to perform these functions for a fee. Id.
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If federal housing resources were unlimited, and if a decent home were in
reality available for every person in need of one, the economic mix pro-
visions of the Act would likely work to the benefit of the very poor or
problem family, and it would be difficult to quarrel with the congressional
choice of this method to promote racial and economic integration. The
federal government's pockets are not very deep, however, when it comes to
funds for public housing, and there are a great many more families who need
help than will receive it.s5 In this situation, when from among the millions
of poor households in need of assistance the government must select the few
who will receive subsidies, income mix policies present a very real danger
that the neediest will be shut out.
The concept of making up operating deficits caused by inadequate federal
subsidization of the poor by giving preference in public housing admissions to
those families whose incomes will permit them to pay higher rents did not
spring full blown from the 1974 Act. HUD attempted to implement such a
policy in 1971 by means of an "advisory" circular directed to local housing
authorities, which strongly suggested that the local agencies institute econom-
ic mix policies.86 The circular was successfully challenged by low income
persons eligible for public housing in Fletcher v. Housing Authority of
Louisville,87 a case which is instructive on the probable effect of an income
mix policy on the very poor. The Housing Authority of Louisville (HAL)
had given force to the -UD directive by establishing a "rent range formula"
which allocated available public housing units to eligible applicants on the
85. HUD figures indicated in 1972 that there were 12.2 million households with in-
comes below $4,000 which presumably were eligible for housing assistance, but only
seven percent of these families actually occupied subsidized housing. See Dissenting
Views of Congressmen Mitchell and Fauntroy, Compilation 548. HUD Secretary
Carla Hills estimates that 400,000 families will be assisted under the section 8 program
during the current fiscal year. Carla Hills, Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, broadcast on National Public Radio, Sept. 10, 1975.
86. HUD Circular RM 7465.12 (June 2, 1971). The circular expressed concern
over excessively high operating costs and deterioration of projects due to concentrations
of low income, problem families, and expressed the need to maintain a cross-section of
tenant families in order to achieve socially and financially sound local programs:
Each Local Authority having a graded rent system, if it has not already done
so, is urged to immediately establish ranges of specified rents and to make ad-
missions to its projects from among eligible applicants at such rents or within
such ranges of rent as may be necessary to achieve, maintain, or improve the
solvency of its operation and to insure, insofar as is possible, serving a rep-
resentative cross-section of the low-income families in its locality.
Id. One of the ways in which HUD suggested that local authorities might upgrade their
tenant populations was to take steps to attract more wage earner and two-parent fami-
lies. Id.
87. 491 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1974).
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basis of the rents such applicants could be expected to pay.88 Admissions
policies provided for the acceleration of higher income applicants over lower
income families on HAL's waiting list in order to obtain a cross-section of
tenant incomes which matched the ratios established by the rent range
formula. Admissions data for the three months following institution of the
income mix policy revealed that while 19.1 percent of all eligible applicants
in the highest income bracket were admitted, only 4.9 percent of eligible
families in the lowest rent range got into public housing.8 9
While the challenge to income mix mounted in Fletcher was based on both
constitutional and statutory grounds, the court reached its decision without
addressing the constitutional issues. The court held that implementation of
the rent range formula by HAL, under the direction of HUD, was an abuse
of discretion since use of income as a criterion for public housing admissions
was not authorized by the Housing Act of 1937, and was in fact inconsist-
ent with the purposes of that Act.90 Fletcher thus clearly delineates the
dilemma inherent in the public housing funding structure: insufficient gov-
ernment subsidies have a natural tendency to turn low income housing
programs into moderate income housing programs. The Sixth Circuit aptly
observed that
[i]f the fiscal crisis of local public housing agencies grows suffi-
ciently severe, Congress may face a choice between forcing the
public housing agencies out of business or of loosening the con-
straints which it has imposed upon public housing authorities. But
this is not the only choice. Congress may choose to appropriate
enough funds to keep the present units in operation under the cur-
rent provisions of the National Housing Act, and force HUD to re-
lease moneys for that purpose. Or Congress may choose to allow
HAL to do what HUD urged it to do in this case.9 1
Since Congress faced its dilemma by opting for the policy of income mix,
Fletcher has apparently been overruled.
The second area in which the policy of economic mix can work to exclude
the neediest families is through the operation of adverse public opinion. It
probably is not inaccurate to observe that existing patterns of income and
88. HAL established a four step rent range and, on the basis of census figures show-
ing the distribution of area families within the income groups corresponding to the rent
ranges, determined that it should be housing a much higher percentage of families with
high rent-paying ability. Accordingly, admissions were conducted using a rough quota
system designed to achieve the desired rental income. Id. at 795.
89. Id. at 797.
90. Id. at 801-06.
91. Id. at 807.
[Vol. 25:320
Public Housing
racial segregation exist because a substantial number of citizens wish to
preserve them. Past housing programs have attempted to break down the
barriers to economic integration and have not been successful: "One of the
major reasons for the emasculation of the rent supplement and public
housing leasing programs was the endeavor to mix richer with poorer, and
black with white." z92  The new Act applies some powerful pressures to
communities to comply with its income mix policies by dispersing assisted
housing throughout more affluent areas,98 but the underlying supply prob-
lem may work to undermine any possible benefits to be derived from this
statutory mandate. Since there is not now, and probably will not be in the
foreseeable future, enough public housing to supply every family in need of
it, communities can interpret economic mix as a permissive policy which
allows them to seek out and assist only the most acceptable poor families, the
"submerged middle class" 94 who can be assimilated into the larger communi-
ty with a minimum of friction.
IV. SHAPING A REMEDY
The months to come will undoubtedly bring a welter of litigation over the
housing provisions of the 1974 Act. It can reasonably be expected that
attacks will focus principally on the methods by which the statute proposes to
allocate its scarce and valuable commodity. In a sense, all tenant suits
assailing the government's administration of its housing programs ultimately
address the problem of inadequate supply. But the new Act has injected the
additional element of income mix into the controversy, and the battle lines
now are more clearly drawn. The 1974 Act is so written that it may be
expected to shift the heaviest burden caused by housing scarcity to a distinct
subclass of public housing eligibles: those at the lowest income levels. The
addition of specific statutory authorization for income discrimination in this
context invites a new round of argument for the recognition of a constitution-
al right to public housing.
It can be argued that the failure of housing authorities to provide a supply
of subsidized housing adequate for all who require it is a denial of equal
92. Roisman, supra note 14, at 704.
93. See generally note 23 supra.
94. The middle-class citizen does not understand the poor of the slums, and he
judges them harshly. . . . One result of this point of view is a search for
housing measures which will distinguish between the good poor and the wicked
poor ...
. . . Housing projects are conceived of as places where the potential middle
class can profit from a change in environment or where members of the
submerged middle class can be helped back on their feet.
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 20.
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protection. The threshold question in applying the current two-tiered equal
protection analysis is the standard of judicial scrutiny appropriate in the
circumstances.95  In order to merit strict scrutiny,96 it must appear that the
state action being challenged either involves a "suspect classification, '97 or
impinges upon a "fundamental right."98
As applied to the Act, the suspect classification argument has two aspects.
The income mix provisions of the Act invite the charge of impermissible
discrimination based upon income.9 9 A second, related argument is that
since blacks are vastly overrepresented in our poor population, it can be
demonstrated statistically that the effect of income mix is an invidious
classification based upon race. 100
95. For a detailed analysis of the procedure followed by the Court in reviewing
equal protection claims, see Comment, The Mandate for a New Equal Protection
Model, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 558 (1975); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
96. In order for a statute to survive strict scrutiny, the state must demonstrate that
it serves a compelling interest which the state has a legitimate need to protect. This
standard of review is to be compared with the more lenient rational basis test, which
would uphold a statute against equal protection challenge if it is rationally related, on
any conceivable basis, to a legitimate legislative goal. See United States v. Carolene
Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
97. See Note, A Question of Balance: Statutory Classifications Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REV. 155 (1973).
98. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, defined fundamental interests as those "explic-
itly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 33-34. Justice Marshall pro-
posed a somewhat broader, though not inconsistent, formula for determining funda-
mentality:
Although not all fundamental interests are constitutionally guaranteed, the de-
termination of which interests are fundamental should be firmly rooted in the
text of the Constitution. The task in every case should be to determine the
extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests
not mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific consti-
tutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the noncon-
stitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scru-
tiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be
adjusted accordingly.
Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (exaction of poll
tax conditions voting privilege on affluence and violates equal protection); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (failure of state to provide free counsel on appeal to
indigent defendants was improper discrimination based upon wealth). But see James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (no suspect classification in state constitutional pro-
vision requiring referendum for low income housing projects but not for other types of
subsidized housing).
100. This argument is offered somewhat pessimistically. It was specifically rejected
in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), which upheld a Texas statute which
varied the levels of assistance provided the different classes of welfare recipients, and
placed the AFDC class, which had a significantly higher percentage of minority mem-
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It seems fair to state that the Supreme Court has refused to view wealth
discrimination as a suspect criterion unless the classification also involves a
fundamental right.'01 iHousing has not yet been established as a fundamen-
tal interest deserving of extraordinary judicial protection, but a strong
argument can be made that it should be so considered. Decent housing
certainly is vital to those individuals who occupy it or wish to occupy it; it is
one of the bare essentials of life. But more than that, decent housing is
important to society, particularly as an effective means of accomplishing the
goal of racial equality. It is its fundamentality in the latter sense that has
prompted some commentators to mark the similarities between housing and
education, and to divine from the recent history of our schools the rationale
upon which courts ought to seize to enhance -the constitutional status of hous-
ing and to take a more aggressive role in promoting adequate housing oppor-
tunities to remedy the effects of past discrimination.
102
Further, employing the definitions of the Court in San Antonio Independ-
ent School District v. Rodriguez,103 housing might be viewed as fundamental
since the exercise of specifically guaranteed constitutional rights is implicitly
conditioned upon first obtaining a suitable living environment. To extend
the parallel between housing and education too far is hazardous, however,
for the Court in Rodriguez specifically declined to recognize education as a
fundamental right; the argument based on wealth discrimination thus failed.
The foregoing arguments are directed toward securing strict scrutiny of the
statutory authorization for use of income as a criterion in public housing
admissions. The state interest to be advanced against this claim is not
insignificant: the efficient allocation of scarce economic resources. It has
been suggested that the two-tiered equal protection approach "will never
protect the poor against discrimination, since the legislatures will always have
a 'valid' reason to discriminate against the poor-preservation of the pricing
system and its accompanying benefits.'1
0 4
In making the equal protection analysis, it is necessary to compare the two
groups who are receiving unequal treatment. To challenge the income mix
bers, at a distinct disadvantage in the disbursal of available funds. But see Roisman,
supra note 14, at 720 & n.141.
101. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
102. See Michelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5
HARv. Civ. Riorrs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 207 (1970); Roisman, supra note 14, at 722.
103. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
104. Wheeler, In Defense of Economic Equal Protection, 22 KAN. L. REv. 1, 9
(1973). Professor Wheeler proposes a new equal protection model designed to ensure
equal access to all state benefits. He provides some rebuttal to the assertion that the
costs of so aiding the poor would be prohibitive by pointing out the costs of not help-
ing the poor.
1976]
Catholic University Law Review
policy of the 1974 Act, it would be sufficient simply to compare public
housing eligibles who are receiving subsidies with those who are not. But this
comparison might be of little use in reaching the underlying problem of
inadequate supply, since a court, even if persuaded that use of the income
criterion is constitutionally improper, would be more likely to order the
"negative" relief of striking down the income mix provisions than it would be
to provide the "affirmative" remedy of directing that additional housing be
provided for the victims of the discrimination.
A more fruitful approach might be to compare the extent to which the
government subsidizes housing for middle and upper income groups with the
amount of assistance provided the needy:
The extent to which Government policy has subsidized the private
homeowner is not generally recognized or acknowledged. The
homeowner who deducts interest and property taxes as costs in
computing his Federal tax return is not required to include the im-
puted value of rent as a part of his income. This generous but
generally unacknowledged Federal subsidy to the affluent or mid-
dle-class homeowner needs to be emphasized in view of the self-
righteous opposition often expressed toward subsidized housing for
the poor.105
If such an argument prevailed, the remedy would need to be either cessation
of favorable tax treatment for the affluent homeowner (a politically impossi-
ble solution), or an increase in the supply of subsidized housing for the
poor. 10
6
A second set of arguments might be made under what is generally known
as the "substantive due process-natural law" theory. °7  This doctrine,
which seems virtually identical to the concept of fundamentality under two-
tiered equal protection, would posit for housing a substantive guarantee
implicit or explicit in the Constitution, somewhat analogous to the protections
which recently have been developed, for example, for the right of privacy' 0 8
105. DOUGLAS REPORT 66.
106. For an extensive comparison of housing assistance afforded affluent and mid-
dle income Americans with that accorded the poor, and the equal protection implications
of this approach, see Mixon, Housing Subsidies, Impoundment, and Equal Protection,
10 HouSTON L. REV. 793 (1973).
107. For an exhaustive treatment of the origin and development of due process as
a substantive limitation on state power, see Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of
Law Before the Civil War, 24 HRv. L. REv. 366 (1911); Corwin, The "Higher Law"
Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 Hv. L. Rv. 149 (1928).
108. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (decision to terminate pregnancy
was protected by the right of privacy derived either from the ninth or fourteenth amend-
ment); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (statute restricting abortion improperly in-
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and the right to travel. 10 9 It has been suggested that a fundamental right to
decent housing may fairly be implied from the third, fourth, fifth and
fourteenth amendments."10
The development of a constitutional right to be housed at public expense
for those who are too poor to house themselves seems a tall order. It
appears unlikely that courts will take it upon themselves to direct such a vast
expenditure of public funds for such an unpopular purpose. Indeed,
perhaps it is not the courts' function to do so. But the courts, in failing to
act, are not doing so for lack of a plausible constitutional theory. When and
if such a constitutional right does appear, the problems of implementation
would be enormous, perhaps insurmountable. Yet there are those who
believe that the -trend is perceptibly in that direction."'
V. CONCLUSION
The much touted Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,
even if it performs in every respect as Congress intended for the promotion
of racial and economic integration, will scarcely make a dent in the nation's
grave housing crisis. Of households which presumably are eligible for public
housing but for which there are no subsidized units available, 1.5 million
have annual incomes below $1,000; 3.1 million make between $1,000 and
$2,000; 3.6 million between $2,000 and $3,000, and 3.2 million between
$3,000 and $4,000.112 The new housing programs are not directed primari-
ly toward solving the problems of these families. Although it should not be
fringed right of privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of pri-
vacy is within the penumbra of explicit constitutional rights and protects sale of contra-
ceptives to married persons).
109. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (state dura-
tional residency requirement for nonemergency medical care for indigents penalizes con-
stitutional right to travel); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (right to travel
is guaranteed by the Constitution, although its exact source is unclear).
110. Comment, Towards a Recognition of a Constitutional Right to Housing, 42
U.M.K.C.L. RV. 362 (1974). The author states:
Nowhere in the Constitution is housing elevated to the stature of a "right."
But the framers did, indirectly at least, suggest that they were cognizant of the
fundamental importance our society attaches to a person's home. "No soldier
shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house. . . ." "The right of people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." In addition to these express
references to housing, other sections of the Constitution impliedly refer to a
person's home. "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ..
Id.
111. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 102, at 209.
112. Dissenting Views of Congressmen Mitchell and Fauntroy, Compilation 547-48.
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suggested that somewhat more "affluent" families, those subsisting at or just
above the poverty level, are not in need of better housing than can be
obtained on the private market, given the finite nature of our housing
resources, the question is compelling: why favor the moderately poor at the
expense of those who need help most?
Certainly a cogent argument can be made that successful implementation
of these new housing programs on a limited scale is an important first step in
demonstrating to the public a fact which has not always been obvious-that
government housing programs can work. Overcoming traditional public
hostility toward housing assistance in general might then pave the way for
heavier subsidies in the future. This kind of reasoning, however, is subtle
indeed, and offers small comfort to the millions of families who have a
substantial (if not a constitutional) interest in decent living conditions which
ought to be vindicated without delay. Moreover, the implications of inaction
reach far beyond individual families, for as we debate the relative merits of
our social programs, few can deny that our cities are in decay.
It would be naive to suggest that remedial social legislation need not be
tempered by hard economic realities. It is arguable that the 1974 Act is the
most efficient means of allocating limited housing dollars so that the greatest
number of people can be assisted while also assuring the fiscal stability of
housing programs. It is certainly better than no housing program at all. But
it would also be naive to suggest that the Act will effect a cure for the
problems of urban blight. The Act may be the answer for the problems
besetting public housing operations, but it leaves our housing problem itself
scarcely touched.
Barbara Graul
